What drove down natural gas production in Argentina? by Barril, Diego & Navajas, Fernando H.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
What drove down natural gas production
in Argentina?
Diego Barril and Fernando H. Navajas
Fundacion de Investigaciones Economicas Latinoamericanas(FIEL),
Argentina, University of Buenos Aires, University of La Plata,
Argentina
April 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35726/
MPRA Paper No. 35726, posted 5. January 2012 00:44 UTC
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What drove down natural gas production 
in Argentina?# 
 
Diego Barril                       Fernando Navajas 
                   (FIEL; UNLP)                    (FIEL; UBA; UNLP) 
 
November, 2011 
 
Abstract 
We address the causes behind the drop in natural gas production in Argentina since 2004, starting from a 
basic supply model that depends on economic incentives, and adding control variables related to different 
potential explanations such as firm specific (or area specific) behavior and the absence of contractual 
renegotiation of concessions extensions. Results from a panel of the change in natural gas production in 
all areas between 2004 and 2009 show that once a basic supply-past production (or reserve) relationship 
is modeled, other often mentioned effects become non-significant. Chiefly among them are firm specific 
effects and the role of renegotiations of concessions extensions. We find preliminary evidence that post 
2007 renegotiations –which are associated with better price prospects- may have had an impact in 
correcting production decline in one leader firm. Other significant effects come from a negative impact of 
a change in the seasonality of production that in turn can be related to demand rationing and to  price 
controls. Overall, the evidence suggests that the observed downcycle conforms to the prediction of a 
simple model of depressed economic incentives acting upon mature conventional natural gas fields and 
hindering investment in reserve additions or new technologies.                 
 
JEL classification:  Q3; Q4 
                                                            
# A previous version of this paper was presented at the Third Latin American Meeting of the International 
Energy Economics Association, Buenos Aires, April, 2011 and the XLVI Annual Meeting of the 
Argentine Association of Political Economy, Mar del Plata, November 2011. We are grateful to 
participants in the Economics Department Seminars of the Universities of CEMA and San Andres, 
Argentina and in particular to Javier Bustos-Salvagno, Juan Carlos Hallak, Jorge Streb and Santiago 
Urbiztondo and to two anonymous referees for very useful comments and suggestions. We also thank 
Martin Kaindl for allowing us to have access to a large data set used for this research and to Nidia Rios 
for helping us to sort out the ‘classification genealogy’ of areas in the initial years of the sample. The 
usual disclaimer applies.    
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What drove down natural gas production in Argentina? 
Diego Barril# and Fernando Navajas∗ 
1. Introduction  
Natural gas production in Argentina has experienced a seemingly bubble dynamics in the last 20 
years, with a pronounced rise and fall separated by a peak in 2004. Figure 1 represents the 
dynamic of the aggregate natural gas production since 1998 with monthly dynamics from 2002 
to 2009. Different hypothesis have been attempted to explain this phenomenon depending on 
the role attributed to firm behavior on the one hand and the regulatory environment on the other. 
To some observers, the culprit of the fall in production since 2004 is explained by the lack of 
investment efforts by large firms and in particular YPF. The alternative view allocates a central 
responsibility to the contractual disruption in natural gas markets created by an interventionist 
paradigm adopted since 2002. Variants of these explanations put different weights to investment 
efforts, lack of contractual renegotiation to extend concessions, a too permissive exports 
program in the late 90s, the under-performance of the major area (Loma de la Lata), departure 
from border prices embedded in imports from Bolivia and the like. However, these effects have 
not been tested and the scant empirical support for these claims relies on casual observation, 
descriptive statistics or partial relationships that do not control for other effects. 
 
 
 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the identification of the factors behind the post 2003 
drop. The importance of clarifying the relative role of the above competing hypotheses is not a 
minor one. From a positive perspective it helps to better understand factors behind natural gas 
production dynamics in Argentina and the future path of conventional natural gas production. 
At a normative level, it may clarify some aspects of the current energy policy debate, provide 
some evidence that may be useful for the resolution of disputes in litigation processes around 
                                                            
# Master Program in Public Polícies, Torcuato Di Tella University, Argentina. E-mail: dbarril@gmail.com 
∗ Department of Economics, University of La Plata and University of Buenos Aires and FIEL, Argentina. 
E-mail: navajas@fiel.org.ar  
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Figure 1
Argentina: Natural Gas production 1998 - 2009
(in Thousand m3, annual in bars (left axis), monthly 2002-2009 in lines (right axis)
2004
source: IAPG
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contractual breaks and finally it may help at assessing the urgency behind the move towards non 
conventional gas development at higher prices.1  
The structure of the paper is the following. In section 2 we sketch a simple supply model of a 
non renewable natural resource that allow us to derive an optimal supply from a producer that is 
constrained by regulated prices and is facing a depletion process (as reserves fall) that raises 
production costs (i.e. decreases productivity). This simple model gives us some guide to specify 
our empirical research on a large data base constructed for this paper and used for the first time 
in an econometric assessment of natural gas production performance in Argentina. In section 3 
we account for the characteristics of our data set -a panel of the change in annual production of 
139 areas between 2004 and 2009-, the specification of our econometric equation and the 
definition and sources of the main variables. Natural gas supply depends on past accumulated 
production (or alternatively on remaining reserves) that represents resource depletion and on a 
set of controls to capture basin and area heterogeneity, firm effects, investment efforts, 
extension of concession contracts, link to an export project and changes in the seasonality of 
demand as a reaction to winter rationing of industrial customers and electricity generators. 
Section 4 presents the results of our econometric testing and discusses the main results. Finally, 
concluding remarks and suggested extensions are included in section 5. 
2. Supply behavior 
Alternative strategies to model the behavior of natural gas production depend on the use of an 
optimization framework to derive supply in a manner related to the basic theory of exhaustible 
resources2 and the explicit modeling of the exploration (drilling and discovery) process that 
precedes extraction or production either from geological models or from empirical econometric 
relationships.3 In this section we sketch a simple model that is based on an explicit optimization 
and is simplified to capture the essentials of the factors we perceive as crucial in the particular 
period of the argentine natural gas market that we are studying. Our setting is an 
oversimplification that lacks a detailed description of the exploration process and in particular 
the channel between exploration development and production. This should not be a nuisance 
given that we are data constrained to study these channels, have much less comparative 
advantage to understand past and current geological processes and are interested in the final 
outcome represented by the dynamics of production. Our setting is also very simple compared 
to more elaborated dynamic optimization models that allow interactions with price expectations 
formation and market structure and behavior. This is also a necessary simplification due to 
prevailing direct market interventionism, which implies fix pricing, absence of demand side 
interactions and diffuse expected parameters.4        
We assume three periods, where the current period of interventionism (“1”) is preceded by a 
previous or past period (“0”, of more normal market behavior) and a future period (“2”) that 
depends on expected prices. Past period values are exogenous factors that are taken as given in the 
                                                            
1 See Navajas (2010) for an account of performance and policy options in the Argentine energy sector.  
2 See for instance Heal and Dasgupta (1979); Krautkraemer (1998); Krautkraemer and Toman (2003) and 
Medlock (2009) 
3 See Wells (1992) for thorough critical survey of these strategies.   
4 Since 2002 prices have been controlled and kept very low in real terms and in relation to import values 
(see for example Cont et al. (2009)). Demand has been growing fast and above domestic supply and has 
been covered by imports or rationing of some (industrial) customers in cold winters. Price expectations 
have remained dominated by the interventionist market regime (which has also intervened on contracts 
between private parties to redirect quantities to serve regulated segments) and expectations on precise 
price changes in such a regime have been difficult to form. Even recent announcements in December 
2010 concerning new pricing rules for unconventional gas discoveries are blurred by pervasive potential 
temporal inconsistencies in the regulation of energy markets.     
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optimization which considers only effects in the present and in the future. Natural gas resources 
are (up to exploration efforts driven by investment  IE1, that have an impact in the next period) 
fixed and given by Y. Aggregate production across the three periods will necessarily add up to the 
resource size, i.e., Y=y0+y1+y2. Prices of natural gas at the wellhead are represented by the vector 
(p0,p1,p2e), which are assumed as fixed parameters with no interactions with domestic output 
equilibrium, as market clearing is provided from abroad through lower exports or higher imports, 
or simply by resorting to demand rationing.5 Prices are assumed the same across areas of 
production, which fits into actual conditions. Cost functions associated with production of natural 
gas depend on current and past (accumulated) production: C0=C0(y0); C1=C1(y1,yo); 
C2=C2(y2,y0+y1). The effect of accumulated past production is negative (up to management of the 
reservoir that depends on investment IM) as it reflects lower productivity from exhaustion of the 
reservoir (an effect that cannot be reverted but only diminished by IM). Both investment spending 
enters into total costs as GE(IE) and GM(IM).  
Given this setting, a firm (under competition) in charge of a production area in the current 
period of (unexpected) intervention (with p1<p0) will recalculate its optimal path of production 
and investment by maximizing the present value of profits as stated in (1)  
 
(2)                                                                    subject to
(1)                                 )()(                                         
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where β is the discount rate applied to period 2 profits. We are assuming that costs depend on 
past exploration investment (through its effect on production and therefore on –nonlinear- costs) 
and on area management investment.6 We are further assuming that the firm will not make any 
management investment in period 2. The firm of course chooses only y1 as this also determines 
y2 through the resource constraint (2). 
Dealing with problem (1) for the case of quadratic costs of production and investment turns out 
in a simple representation of the supply function. We assume that C1=0.5.c.y12+0.5. 
∧
c (IM).y02 ; 
C2=0.5.c.y22+0.5. 
∧
c (IM).(y0+y1)2; GE(IE)=0.5.ρE.IE2; GM(IM)= 0.5.ρM.IM2. We assume that 
marginal cost are increasing in current and past production with different parameters (c and 
∧
c , 
which depend on management investment, with 
∧
c ’<0, i.e. more management investment reduces 
costs of production by diminishing the negative effect of cumulative production). Investment 
marginal costs are also increasing in investment effort with different parameters (ρE and ρM). In 
this setting, supply in the current period can be written as  
 
                                                            
5  This conforms to the observed pattern in Argentina where cuts of exports to Chile and imports from 
Bolivia and an LNG facility have contributed to market clearing or rationing has been used as a last resort 
in the winter season.  See Cont and Navajas (2004), Navajas (2006) and FIEL (2007, 2008 and 2009) for 
accounts of the natural gas demand supply imbalance during the sample period.  
6 Thus, in period 1 Y is only affected by exploration investment effort in period 0 (IE0), while investment 
effort in period 1 only affects the size of the resource in period 2.   
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Expression (3) establishes a linear relationship between production and reserves R (see for 
instance Medlock (2009)) and is a well known consequence of assuming quadratic costs (see for 
instance Pickering (2008)). Given cost parameters and the discount rate (c, 
∧
c  ,β), the supply of 
natural gas in the current period will depend (positively) on current and (negatively) on 
discounted future prices as well as (negatively) on past cumulative production and (positively) 
on remaining reserves. Expressions (4) to (6) also show the channels where investment efforts 
IE and IM affect current and future production. In expression (6) we notice that remaining 
reserves in (at the beginning of) the current period depend on investment efforts in exploration 
in the past period. The complaint about lack of investment effort in the past as a driver of falling 
production is captured by this effect.7 Meanwhile, expressions (4) and (5) show that area 
management investment in the current period will diminish the negative effect of cumulative 
past production on current production.       
Alternatively, given that R1=Y-y0 we can write (3) as (7) denoting a negative relationship 
between current production and aggregate past production. This formulation is slightly different 
to (3) since y0 does not directly depends on past investment effort (IE0) as in the case of 
remaining reserves in period 1, R1.  
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The other first order conditions in the maximization problem written in (1) and (2) relate with 
the choice of investments in exploration IE1 and area management IM1 in the current period. 
The former will have an impact in the future period while the latter will impact in the current 
one. Interior solutions from these first order conditions are given by 
 
                                                            
7 From expression (6) it is shown that remaining reserves comes from an identity that suggest that they 
depend on past investment efforts (affecting the total resource size Y) and on past production y0.  
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Investment in exploration IE is a forward looking activity that depends on the ratio between the 
expected discounted cash flow β.(p2e-c.y2) and the cost of capital ρE. An extension of the 
concession can be seen as affecting this decision. Seen as an equivalent of an increase in the 
discount factor β, an extension of the concession implies a higher investment in exploration (an 
in area management investment IM, see(11)), and a higher future production. On the other hand, 
the effect on current production is indeterminate as a higher β reduces current production 
(according to (3)) but it also increases investment management which in turn reduces the drop in 
production caused by cumulative past production. 
In the next section we take the relationship between production and cumulative past production 
(or reserves) represented in (7) (or (3)) as the logical starting point in our empirical search for 
the determinants of natural gas production in Argentina, from which we explore the relevance of 
several control variables (basin effects, firm effects, concession’ extension, seasonal effects, etc) 
related to the hypothesis or effects that have been mentioned in the introduction. On the other 
hand, we acknowledge that the basic equilibrium theory outlined in the previous model tell us 
nothing about the likely dynamics (where (7) or (3) are static or equilibrium relationship), about 
the alternative specifications or functional forms (where the linear form of (3) is a rather 
restrictive one arising from also restrictive assumptions) and about alternative effects of other 
control variables (that nevertheless may be related to some of the variables of the basic model). 
So empirical modeling should also consider these shortcomings. 
3. Empirical Modeling  
Our empirical analysis is based on a data on annual production of NG at the area level, after an 
effort to build our data set from detailed raw data provided by the Instituto Argentino del 
Petróleo y el Gas (IAPG). This basic data was further evaluated and made consistent to allow a 
correct identification of the areas across years.8 The original data comes from a panel of annual 
production by area from 1993 to 2009, with 2880 observations distributed in 282 areas. Given 
that our objective in this paper was to study the drop since 2004, we use eight consecutive years 
of production from 2003 to 2009, which in annual rates of change reduces the observations to 
640, representing 139 areas.9  The data identifies the firm that operates the area (there is only 
one operator per area) and the basin in which is located.  
 
We also gathered, from the same source, data on proven reserves and were able to construct 
annual aggregate past production for all areas. While data on annual aggregate past production 
                                                            
8  We had to perform a detailed analysis of the original data set provided by IAPG in order to make 
consistent the names of the areas across time, as denominations changed in many cases in the early 
1990’s due to new concessions and the privatization of YPF process.    
9 Besides the work on the homogeneization of data, and despite the fact that the sample selected is the 
right one to represent the “period of interventionism” defined in the analysis of section 2, there were 
several data limitations at this stage to the testing of a broad model for the large sample 1993-2009. For 
instance, key variables such as proven reserves or exploration efforts (new wells) are available after 1994, 
and the later variable comes in a different regional aggregation before 1997. This fact and the extension 
of the lag we use (3 to 6 years) to capture the effects of exploration efforts, reduces the sample employed.     
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is very reliable, we found several changes and instability with the data on proven reserves10. We 
thus decided to use in our empirical model aggregate past production (as in (7)) rather than 
reserves (as in (3)). However, as in our testing we express both variables as a ratio in relation to 
total resources by area (Y in the notation used in the previous section), both definitions become 
related. We nevertheless explore the sensitivity of results to using reserves instead of 
cumulative past production. We have further identified within our panel if the area has 
renegotiated the extension of the concession and if it has been associated with an export 
contract.11 We also gather data on exploration (number of wells drilled per year) for each basin 
as from 1997 which we include to proxy exploration investment effort. Finally we constructed 
an indicator of the change in production seasonality (towards the summer) from the log of a 
ratio between the average monthly production during the summer and the maximum monthly 
production for the same year12. Table 1summarizes the definition of variables.  
The specification we adopt to study the drop in natural gas production between 2004 and 2009 
is summarized in equation (12). As the explanatory variable, we take the logarithm of the ratio 
between production in t and production in t-1 in the area i, approximating the annual rate of 
change. The independent variables are the log of the ratio between accumulated past production 
and total resource endowment and a set of controls defined below:   
(12)                                                                ..                  
.....)log(.)log(
76
543214
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where 
yit , yi,t-1 : area i production in year t. 
y0,t : cumulative past production in area i in year t. 
Yit=y0,it+Rit : resource size in area i in year t. 
                                                            
10  Proven reserves data are estimates that may oscillate depending on considerations by firms on 
economically recoverable resources from a given reservoir and are therefore depend on the economic 
environment and the influence of regulatory policies. Cumulative past production is instead a much 
objective and measurable variable.   
11 We made a careful estimation of renegotiations and export contracts by area using information from 
official resolutions (INFOLEG), newspapers and sources from the sector. We considered only resolutions 
that refer to (or identify) production areas, and leave uncovered those that refer to basins (given the 
impossibility to allocate it to specific areas within the basin). Thus there may be a potential (but small) 
omission error from our estimation.   
12 As mentioned before, the change in seasonality meant a shift of demand towards the summer, as many 
potentially (and effectively) rationed users in the manufacturing sector moved demand to the months 
where first-served users (residential and commercial) were not active or had low demand. The same effect 
was observed for thermal electricity generators, as (cheaper, or price controlled) natural gas was available 
in the summer to avoid use of more expensive liquid fuels. For some observers, this change in the 
seasonal pattern of the demand for natural gas had both a cause and a consequence. The cause was the 
price repressed regime that led to a strong excess demand scenario particularly visible in cold winters. 
The consequence was that summer production tasks in the fields or areas –directed at preparing the areas 
for the winters- suffered from this shift in demand. In other words, the shift in demand could be seen as a 
shock that negatively affects productivity (for a given investment effort in production maintenance IM in 
the notation of the model of section 2). Some observers doubted on the empirical merit of this last 
explanation (while accepting that there was a shift in demand, possibly related to rationing in the winter). 
Our estimates below tend to confirm that the shift in demand had a negative effect on production 
performance.           
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Rit : remaining proven reserves in area i in year t 
IEit : exploration investment effort in area i in year t. 
Bi : dummies for the basin in which the area is located (Austral, San Jorge, NOA). 
SFi: vector of specific leader producers (YPF, TOTAL, PAE). 
LLLi: dummy for Loma de la Lata area. 
LFi: dummy if the area is operated13 by a large (top 9) firm. 
ERi: dummy if “i” has renegotiated the extension of the concession (before or as from 2007). 
EXi: dummy if “i” has participated in export contracts. 
SEASit: Seasonal (summer) effect of area i in year t. 
 
 
 
We estimate (12) as a pooling model for 640 observations covering changes in production for 
139 areas between 2004 and 2009. Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics of the main 
variables. The first panel shows statistics of basic data in 2004 and 2009 of daily annual 
production (in thousand cubic meters), cumulative past production, seasonal (summer) ratio and 
number of wells explored. There was a clear drop in production between these years, while 
cumulative production as a percentage of total resources went up. The seasonal effect shows a 
shift to summer production which is demand-driven as industrial production became rationed in 
                                                            
13 Results presented in Section 4 (Table 3) remain if we define firms as “majority shareholder” rather than 
“operators” in our simple. As some of the firms that operate the areas are not the majority shareholder this 
distinction may create doubts about actual incentives. However, results indicate that there is no sensitivity 
to this redefinition.  
Variable Definition Source
Production of natural gas Quantities in thousand of m3. IAPG
Cumulative production Production between 1991 and t-1. IAPG
Resource size Sum between cumulative production and remaining proven reserves. IAPG
Exploration Number of exploration finished gas wells between t-6 and t-3. IAPG
Summer average production Average monthly production during the summer (January, February and March). IAPG
Maximun production Maximun monthly production in the year. IAPG
Austral Binary variable, =1 when the area is located in Austral basin. IAPG
San Jorge Binary variable, =1 when the area is located in San Jorge basin. IAPG
Noroeste Binary variable, =1 when the area is located in Noroeste basin. IAPG
YPF Binary variable, =1 when the area is operated by YPF (LLL excluded). IAPG
Total Austral Binary variable, =1 when the area is operated by Total Austral. IAPG
PAE Binary variable, =1 when the area is operated by Pan American Energy. IAPG
Loma La Lata (LLL) Binary variable, =1 when the area is Loma La Lata. IAPG
Top 9 firms Binary variable, =1 when the area is operated by a large (top 9, YPF excluded) firm. IAPG
Extension before 2007 Binary variable, =1 when the extension of the area has been renegotiated before 2007. Own Estimates; INFOLEG
Extension from 2007 (post 2007) Binary variable, =1 when the extension of the area has been renegotiated between 2007 and 2009. Own Estimates
Exports contracts Binary variable, =1 when the area has participated in exports contracts. Own Estimates; INFOLEG
Definition and source of variables 
Table 1
10 
 
the winter. Finally numbers of new wells drilled (so called finished) for exploration shows an 
already very low activity in 2004 (with substantially less than 1 new well per area per year) 
which was even lower in 2009. The dummy variables column shows the percentage of total 
observations covered by the dummy and inform on certain characteristics of the variables. 
 
 
4. Discussion of results 
Results of testing equation (12) are reported in Table 3 in columns (1) to (5). The sensitivity of 
results to using remaining reserves as an independent variables is shown in columns (6) to (9). 
Variables coefficients and p-values are shown in rows while the columns show different 
simplifications on the initial equation. Column (1) shows the unrestricted version of equation 
(12).Column (2) and (3) are simplifications of the initial model that eliminates non-significant 
variables. Column (4) tests for interactions between basin, firm-specific and renegotiation 
extension dummies and the slope of the effect of cumulative past production; and column (5) is 
a final simplification. Meanwhile, columns (6) to (9) repeat the same procedure in the case we 
use remaining reserves instead of cumulative past production as an explanatory variable.   
The first results in column (1) of Table 1 show the relevance of the main explanatory variable   
reflecting the cumulative past production effect. The constant, which we interpret as capturing a 
combination of the depressed-price regime effect and past investment effort, is also significant 
at 1%. Other less significant effects are firm-specific effects (capturing a larger drop than that 
explained by the model in the case of the firm PAE) and the seasonal summer effect, i.e. a shift 
in demand due to abnormal industrial demand rationing during the winter, which is also a by-
product of the depressed-price regime. All these effects (except for PAE which has a very 
Daily Anual 
Production (in 
Th. M3)
Cumulative 
Production share 
in total resource
Seasonal 
(summer) Ratio1
Exploration (bet. t-
6 and t-3)
2004
Obs 92 92 92 92
Mean 1549 0.53 0.82 0.29
Median 204 0.56 0.87 0.00
                           St. Dev. 4246 0.25 0.17 0.83
Max. 35564 0.97 1.00 5.00
Min. 0.56 0.00 0.19 0.00
2009
Obs 125 125 125 125
Mean 1056 0.60 0.84 0.22
Median 88 0.65 0.89 0.00
                           St. Dev. 2808 0.26 0.17 0.85
Max. 20847 1.00 1.00 6.00
Min. 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.00
Austral 15.3%
San Jorge 23.8%
Noroeste 6.7%
YPF 18.8%
Total Austral 2.8%
PAE 7.2%
Loma La Lata 0.9%
Top 9 firms 45.0%
Extension before 2007 1.9%
Extension after 2007 4.8%
Exportation 12.2%
Dummy variables share in sample (%)
1/ Monthly average summer production (Jan, Feb,Mar)t / Monthly maximun productiont
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variables
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interesting interplay with the renegotiation effect) survive to across the regressions reported in 
Table 3.  
 
A very important result reported in Table 3 is that once the above mentioned effects (which can 
be derived from simple first principles of supply behavior) are modeled, other often mentioned 
reasons for the decline in natural gas production become non-significant. Chiefly among them 
are “past investment effort”, “Loma de la Lata effect” and the “YPF effect”, which have been 
made responsible in many allegations steaming from casual observation to more elaborated 
descriptive statistics. What the results tell us is that, while very important, the “collapse” in the 
Loma de la Lata area can be explained by past production dynamics and price effects. Of course 
these effects have to do with “insufficient investment” to sustain production along the observed 
sample (or even before). This is what the analysis of section 2 suggests. However, the empirical 
finding is that these effects are not dissimilar for Loma de la Lata or YPF with respect to other 
areas or firms. In other words, the firm or area has not been describing an “abnormal” 
production path.   
Another often mentioned –particularly in the energy business community- effect for natural gas 
production drop in Argentina is the (absence of) renegotiation of concessions extensions, which 
do not allow mobilization of resources as the end period approaches.14 In the simple model of 
section 2 extensions enlarge the horizon of decisions and (for given a discount rate) may 
increase the marginal benefit of investment and production in the future. But this inter-temporal 
allocation of production effort makes the effect on current production ambiguous. In our results 
in Table 3, the renegotiation dummies effect on the rate of change of natural gas production are 
non-significant, both for extensions granted before or after 2007. The reason for the separation 
between both periods is that after 2008, renegotiation may interact with new incentive schemes 
for “new” natural gas production –the so called Gas-Plus scheme-that come with higher prices, 
closer to scarcity or border (imports) prices. In other words, while pre-2007 renegotiations can 
be regarded as extensions-without-price-signals (or rather with bad price signals) in the sense 
that they were mere extensions of contracts in an otherwise repressed price regime, the post 
2007 renegotiations are a bit different, since they co-existed with recently established incentive 
schemes that recognize that “new” gas could receive a higher price.  
Results reported in column (1) of Table 3 show that both renegotiation dummies are non-
significant. Nevertheless, the post 2007 renegotiation dummy has a significant interaction with 
the cumulative past production effect, which is reported in column (4) of Table 3. It informs that 
for those areas that renegotiated the extension of contracts after 2007, the negative effect of past 
cumulative production on current production diminishes (i.e. becomes less negative) implying 
that renegotiations after 2007 have had an impact, even if this result will have to be confirmed 
with a larger sample that include more years. Another relatively significant effect that arises in 
column (4) results is a San Jorge basin effect, again reducing the rate of drop of production. 
Further, the inclusion of both (renegotiation after 2007 and San Jorge) dummies turn into non-
significant the PAE effect, which is unsurprising given that this firm operates mainly in San 
Jorge and has renegotiated its extension after 2007. Thus, our results suggest that PAE was 
underperforming until it renegotiated its concession in 2007, to become more dynamic after that 
year.15 
                                                            
14 Most of the concessions of areas in Argentina were granted by the federal government, dated from the 
deregulation and privatization of the early 90s and its time horizon was not approaching a last period. 
Even so they were judged as prone to be extended by the new concession authorities (Provinces) that 
emerged from the implementation of a constitutional reform in the mid 90s. Thus, as Table 2 indicates, a 
few areas (including the largest one Loma de la Lata) extended its concession period before 2007 and 
some more did so since 2007. 
15 The reason for concentrating our attention in PAE was driven by our interest to examine the robustness 
of the significant negative effect on production initially observed for that firm (see variable 6.c in Table 
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The right-hand side panel of Table 3, from columns (6) to (9), replicates the estimation 
procedure by using remaining reserves instead of cumulative past production.16 We observed 
                                                                                                                                                                              
3). We have found that this effect disappears when the interaction of PAE with the renegotiation variable 
is considered (see variable13 in Table 3).  
16  We also examined the potential for a system model where reserves depend on past investment 
exploration effort, but found no evidence in favor of such specification. 
Dependent variable: ln(prodt) - ln(prodt-1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1.   Constant -0.218 -0.245 -0.215 -0.201 -0.19 0.081 0.044 0.057 0.084
(0.001)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** -0.149 (0.384) (0.208) (0.050)*
2.   Cumulative past production1 -0.209 -0.209 -0.205 -0.261 -0.262
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
3.   Remain Reserves2 0.127 0.126 0.118 0.1
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.001)**
4.   Exploration Investment 0.005 -0.008
(0.728) (0.567)
5.   Basin
          a.    Austral -0.011 -0.026
(0.853) (0.682)
          b.    San Jorge -0.037 -0.055
(0.443) (0.249)
          c.    NOA -0.14 -0.149
(0.306) (0.271)
6.   Leader Firm
          a.    YPF3 0.06 0.077 0.044 0.065
(0.308) (0.191) (0.436) (0.259)
          b.    Total Austral -0.042 -0.023 -0.077 -0.054
(0.798) (0.580) (0.671) (0.267)
          c.    PAE -0.153 -0.163 -0.159 -0.023 -0.052 -0.087
(0.055)+ (0.038)* (0.037)* (0.762) (0.394) (0.149)
7.   Loma La Lata Area -0.05 0.03 -0.072 -0.033
(0.772) (0.508) (0.664) (0.434)
8.   Top 9 firms4 0.09 0.104 0.076 0.025 0.077 0.089 0.051
(0.156) (0.034)* (0.035)* (0.543) (0.229) (0.075)+ (0.149)
9.   Renegotiated extensión of concession
          a.    Pre 2007 0.047 0.001
(0.657) (0.995)
          b.    Post 2007 0.051 0.012
(0.441) (0.850)
10.   Export Contracts 0.004 0.009
(0.980) (0.961)
11. Seasonal (summer) change5 -0.218 -0.222 -0.222 -0.222 -0.221 -0.261 -0.264 -0.263 -0.248
(0.071)+ (0.066)+ (0.062)+ (0.046)* (0.047)* (0.033)* (0.031)* (0.029)* (0.040)*
12. Multiplicative dummies with CPP or RR (2)
          a.    LLL -0.022 0.023 0.165
(0.871) (0.832) (0.073)+
          b.    YPF3 0.134 0.14 -0.011
(0.106) (0.081)+ (0.697)
          c.    Total Austral 0.067 0.053 0.043
(0.375) (0.493) (0.335)
          d.    PAE 0.082 0.082 -0.003
(0.278) (0.148) (0.937)
          e.    Austral Basin -0.075 -0.076 0.052
(0.559) (0.549) (0.083)+
          f.    San Jorge Basin 0.131 0.137 0.02
(0.067)+ (0.045)* (0.608)
          g.    NOA Basin 0.035 0.039 0.159
(0.673) (0.637) (0.073)+
          h.    Renegotiated Extensions
                    i.    Pre 2007 0.118 0.095 -0.088
(0.210) (0.285) (0.319)
                    ii.   Post 2007 0.155 0.147 -0.062
(0.060)+ (0.076)+ (0.122)
13. Renegotiated Extension After 2007 *PAE 0.393 0.382 0.015
(0.001)** (0.000)** (0.893)
Observations 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640
R squared 0.169 0.164 0.161 0.204 0.204 0.103 0.098 0.094 0.109
3/ Excludes LLL.
4/ Excludes YPF (LLL included). 
/ {l [A d i (j f b )] l [ hl i d i ] }
Equation (12)
2/ {ln (Remain Reserves)t - ln (Total Resource)t}
p values in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3
Regression Results 
1/ {ln (Cumulative Production)t - ln (Total Resource)t}
Pooled OLS with White SD
With Remain Reserves
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that even though the overall adjustment is less satisfactory (with R2 significantly lower) the 
main results of the empirical model remain. Reserves and the seasonal (summer) effect are 
strongly significant while exploration investment, basin or specific firm (including Loma de la 
Lata) and renegotiation of extensions effects are non-significant. Post 2007 renegotiations do 
not enter either as before when consider interactively with one of the leaders (PAE), which does 
not describe a heterogeneous behavior as in the previous specification. The interactive dummies 
with reserves (represented in 12 and in column (9)) are also bit different but mostly non-
significant. The constant becomes slightly significant at 5% in the last simplified equation in 
column (9).17       
5. Conclusions  
The main result of this paper is that the drop in natural gas production experienced by Argentina 
can indeed be modeled from a basic standard theory approach, which is the natural setting to 
start exploring the significance of other often cited explanations attributed to firms, areas, 
renegotiation of concessions and the role of past investment. Our results do not allow a 
complete screening of the relative merits of past (pre-interventionism) investment performance 
and current (post interventionism) price controls, but they are clear enough on the scant 
evidence in favor of firm-specific or area-specific effects that may suggest abnormal behavior 
and on the relative low power on production dynamics on renegotiations-without-economic-
signals. Overall the evidence is pretty much consistent with the deleterious effect of very low 
price signals on an already mature conventional gas pattern. Of course, past investment efforts 
are present insofar as they determine the dimension of the natural gas resource base at the 
beginning of an interventionist era that is still in place. But whatever the mismatch between 
forecasted and accomplished required investments in the years previous to the interventionist 
era, the fierce control of prices and market transactions validated ex-post any over-conservative 
attitude towards investment in the natural gas upstream. Looking from a different angle, the 
results of this paper suggest that we cannot expect good news from natural gas production 
performance in the near future, as the features of our empirical model become more dominant. 
The recent move towards non conventional gas with higher prices is –despite regulatory 
shortcomings- an obliged strategy for Argentina.   
We think that while the results of this paper are already robust enough to contribute to the 
understanding of, or avoid confusions on, the causes behind the drop in natural gas production 
in the 2000s in Argentina, they have also opened suggested lines of research to improve our 
modeling of production performance. On such avenue is to enlarge the period of study to better 
capture and understand the natural gas production bubble experienced by Argentina in the last 
25 years and the reasons for the seemingly mismatch between exploration efforts and demand 
growth, a fact anticipated by a World Bank report in 199018. Another one looks into the future 
and should be devoted to modeling and testing the effects of the introduction of new incentive 
schemes for new unconventional gas, understood as a technical change in the sector that may 
redefine future resources or at least reduce the foretold decline of existing ones.         
 
 
 
                                                            
17 All these basic results –except the non-significance of the exploration investment (variable 4) and of the 
Top 9 firms (variable 8) - remain if the second model is tested as a panel Random effect model, which is 
suggested as the appropriate model by an LM test at a 5% confidence in the model of column (9), 
although this disappears in the case of the models of columns (6), (7) and (8). One drawback of these 
models is that exploration investment has a wrong sign (negative) on its effect on production.   
18 See World Bank (1990) and the quotation discussed in Navajas (2006).  
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